Vinstonas wrote:JFK doesn't seem like a war mongering type of president, more like a bleeding heart liberal type, like Bill Clinton.
JFK's election campaign set the precedent for Ronald Reagan since he campaigned by charging the Eisenhower administration with allowing a missile-gap to develop. The claims about JFK allegedly withdrawing from Vietnam are based on a misreading of NSAM 263. NSAM 263 was the result of a suggestion made by Robert McNamara and Maxwell Taylor. The initiative for this did not come from Kennedy himself. It came from McNamara and Taylor who suggested that Kennedy make a public announcement about the likely withdrawal of 1000 troops from Vietnam, subject to successful training of Saigon armed forces. Their suggested statement was not much different than many statements made by Democrats in recent elections about the "Wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time." McNamara and Taylor were not advocating anything dramatic, they just thought that it would be possible to have enough Saigon troops trained to allow Kennedy to announce the upcoming withdrawal of 1000 US troops.
But Kennedy wasn't even willing to go that far. Although Kennedy nominally AOK'd the suggestion of McNamara & Taylor, he at first rejected the idea of making a public announcement about it. Eventually Kennedy was pressed in an interview with questions about Vietnam and finally did make a brief comment about the McNamara/Taylor proposal where he explicitly mentioned them by name and credited the idea to them. The need to placate public sentiment is enough to explain the McNamara/Taylor suggestion that the withdrawal of 1000 troops be announced, subject to the condition that the training of Saigon armed forces continue successfully as planned. That last bit is an important qualifier. NSAM 263 was not advocacting unconditional withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. It only suggested that the withdrawal of 1000 US troops be carried out provided that the training of Saigon forces to replace these 1000 troops continued as planned. We've had lots of statements by Democrats today that are very similar to NSAM 263 and which advocate that Iraqi forces be better trained so that they can replace US forces on the ground.
Richard Shultz, THE SECRET WAR AGAINST HANOI, has a lot of relevant details about Kennedy's efforts to beef up the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a counterforce to the CIA. When Kennedy became President the CIA had given up the notion of rollback. Before 1956 there had been an intent of using counter-intelligence to achieve rollback. After the events of 1956 in Hungary the CIA gave up on this and accepted containment. When Kennedy entered office he began seeking a plan for achieving rollback in North Vietnam by setting up something like the contras in Nicaragua. The CIA was opposed to this and therefore Kennedy ended up transferring a lot of authority to the JCS for them to use in planning such operations in North Vietnam. This had nothing to do with Kennedy learning of operations behind his back and everything to do with the fact that the CIA was not as gung-ho interventionist as Kennedy and the JCS.
Kennedy's attempts to initiate an insurgency movement in North Vietnam as detailed in Shultz, THE SECRET WAR AGAINST HANOI, do not fit in with the picture of an alleged intent by Kennedy to end the war. It's certainly possible that a different strategy towards the war would have been followed if Kennedy had remained President. His attempts to form an insurgency movement in North Vietnam read like a more extended version of Nixon's Vietnamization of the war. But the argument that Kennedy was somehow seeking to end the war really just rests on an over-extrapolation from NSAM 263 which ignores the context of that document.
Apart from all of that, even if we agree to withhold judgment on what Kennedy might have done in relation to Vietnam had he lived, the attempts to explain the assassination by reference to NSAM 263 break down when we try to explain the roles of McNamara and Taylor. Either these two individuals were a part of the actual assassination conspiracy or they weren't. If they weren't then it's hard to make sense of why they would have been allowed to remain in prominent positions of authority if the motive for the assassination had been NSAM 263. McNamara & Taylor were more directly related to the origins of NSAM 263 than Kennedy himself was. It was their suggestion in the first place! If the assassination had really been motivated by NSAM 263 then I would definitely expect both of them to be at least removed from their positions (the way that the head of the CIA John McCone was removed by LBJ). But both of them remained secure. So it's hard to take NSAM 263 seriously as the motive for the assassination. Of course, if McNamara & Taylor really were a part of the assassination conspiracy then that would only strengthen the argument that NSAM 263 was a dummy maneuver intended to mislead. If the assassination conspirators themselves suggested NSAM 263 then clearly the motive for the assassination was somewhere else.
Anyone who takes an interest in NSAM 263 should actually look up FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-1963 VOLUME IV, VIETNAM AUGUST-DECEMBER 1963 where it appears and read all of the documents around it. These a re a couple:
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Summary Record of the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council, White House, Washignton, October 2, 1963, 6 p.m.
[Here follows an attendance list.]
The President opened the meeting by summarizing where we now stand on U.S. policy toward Vietnam. Most of the officials involved here are in agreement. We are not papering over our differences. We are agreed to try to find effective means of changing the political atmosphere in Saigon.
We are agreed that we should not cut off all U.S. aid to Vietnam, but we are agreed on the necessity of trying to improve the situation in Vietnam by bringing about changes there. Reports of disagreements do not help the war effort in Vietnam and do no good to the government as a whole. We must all sign on with good heart set out to implement the actions decided upon. Here and in Saigon we must get ahead by carrying out the agreed policy. Because we are agreed, we should convey our agreement to our subordiantes. There are no differences between Washington and Ambassador Lodge or among the State and Defense Departments and the CIA. Ambassador Lodge has full authority to pull into line all U.S. government representatives in Saigon
The President then turned to consideration of the draft public statement (copy attached). He said that attacks on the Diem regime in public statements are less effective than actions which we plan to take. He preferred to base our policy on the harm which Diem's political actions are causing to the effort against the Viet Cong rather than on our moral opposition to the kind of government Diem is running.
Mr. Ball said that he and Secretary Rusk felt that there should be stress on the moral issues invovled because of the beneficial effect which such emphasis produced in world public opinion, especially among U.S. delegates.
The President replied that the major problem was with U.S. public opinion and he believed we should stress the harm Diem's policies are doing to the war effort against the Communists.
Mr. Bundy said that Secretary McNamara and General Taylor wanted to emphasize the objective of winning the war. State Department officials wanted something more than an objective of merely winning the war. Mr. Harriman commented that he was prepared to accept the language as proposed.
The President objected to the phrase "by the end of this year" in the sentence "The U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Vietnam could be withdrawn." He believed that if we were not able to take this action by the end of this year, we would be accused of being over optimistic.
Secretary McNamara said he saw great value in this sentence in order to meet the view of Senator Fulbright and others that we are bogged down forever in Vietnam. He said the sentence reveals that we have a withdrawal plan. Furthermore, it commits us to emphasize the training of the Vietnamese, which is something we must do in order to replace U.S. personnel with Vietnamese.
The draft announcement was changed to make both of the time predictions included in paragraph 3 a part of the McNamara-Taylor report rather than as predictions of the President.
Mr. Bundy raised the question as to Ambassador Lodge's view of the proposed draft policy statement. He said Ambassador Lodge could be told that because of the time pressure it had not been possible to clear the statement with him, but that it was felt here it would meet his requirements.
The President then asked about the measures which we would take to bring pressure on Diem. Secretary McNamara replied that a working group would propose recommendations for the President's decision at a later date.
The President directed that no one discuss with the press any measures which he may decide to undertake on the basis of the recommendations to be made to him. He said that we should not talk about such measures until they are agreed. The selected cuts in U.S. assistance should be discussed only in the Cabinet Room until all of them were finally agreed upon.
Mr. Salinger said that he would decline to answer any press questions about what measures the U.S. proposed to take.
In response to a question by Administrator Bell, the President said he should reply to inquiring Congressmen that we are continuing our present aid schedule. After a further exchange,
the President made clear that what he thought we should tell the Congressmen should be limited to saying that aid which we are now extending would be continued. He recognized that aid we are now extending is not that we had been extending prior to the August disturbances.
Secretary McNamara felt that Mr. Bell should say nothing. The group would return to the President by Friday with specific recommendations.
The President then asked what we should say about the news story attacking CIA which appeared in today's Washington Daily News. He read a draft paragraph for inclusion in the public statement but rejected it as being too fluffy. He felt no one would believe a statement saying there were no differences of view among the various U.S. agencies represented in Saigon. He thought that we should say that we had a positive policy endorsed by the National Security Council and that such policy would be carried out by all concerned.
Mr. Bundy suggested the President direct everyone present not to discuss the paper. Now that a policy decision had been made, we should be absolutely certain that no one continues to talk to the press about the differences among U.S. agencies.
The President said that as of tonight we have a policy and a report endorsed by all members of the National Security Council.
The President asked again about the means we plan to use in changing the political atmosphere in Saigon.
Secretary McNamara discussed the recommendations in paragraph 4 of the report and said the group would be returning to the President with specific action to be taken.
After the President left the meeting, there was a discussion as to how to put into final form the recommendations for the President. It was decided that a final sub-group would make more precise the recommendations contained in paragraph 4, and that the group of principals would meet the following day in the absence of the President in order to prepare a paper for him to consider on Friday.
The only substantive point that came out in this discussion was Secretary McNamara's belief that economic pressures against Diem should be undertaken over a longer period of time rather than a short period which would produce critical reactions in Saigon.
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Report of Action No. 2472, Taken at the 519th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 2, 1963
McNamara-Taylor Report on Vietnam
a. Endorsed the basic presentation on Vietnam made by Secretary McNamara and General Taylor.
b. Noted the President's approval of the following statement of U.S. policy which was later released to the press:
"1.
The security of South Viet Nam is a major interest of the United States as other free nations. We will adhere to our policy of working with the people and Government of South Viet Nam to deny this country to Communism and to suppress the externally stimulated and supported insurgency of the Viet Cong as promptly as possible. Effective performance in this undertaking is the central objective of our policy in South Viet Nam.
"2.
The military program in South Viet Nam has made progress and is sound in principle, though improvements are being energetically sought.
"3. Major U.S. assistance in support of this military effort is needed only until the insurgency has been suppressed or until the national security forces of the Government of South Viet Nam are capable of suppressing it.
"Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965, although there may be a continuing requirement for a limited number of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by the end of this year, the U.S. program for training Vietnamese should have progressed to the point where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to South Viet Nam can be withdrawn.
"4. The political situation in South Viet Nam remains deeply serious. The United States has made clear its continuing opposition to any repressive actions in South Viet Nam. While such actions have not yet significantly affect the miltary effort, they could do so in the future.
"5.
It remains the policy of the United States, in South Viet Nam as in other parts of the world, to support the efforts of the people of that country to defeat aggression and to build a peaceful and free society."
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