God cannot logically exist?

[willymonfrete]

Parts of this are borrowed from a forum where I asked this question and got some replies,with my own added commentary:

So I read this https://philpapers.org/rec/JACDRO

Dharmakirti basically states that isvara's cognitions are changing since the world is changing,however his self-sufficiency must be permanent(this is true because a self-suficient being must be partless,and thus would be immutable),so the theists claim Isvara is both permanent and impermanent,which to him is impossible.


If isvara is both permanent and impermanent, then how are his permanent attributes related to his impermanent ones? How are his impermanent attributes caused? They cannot be self-causing, because only a permanent entity can be self-causing, and they cannot be caused by a permanent entity, because a self-causing permanent entity could not create change and variation. If God's parts are unrelated, how can he be a coherent entity? If he has parts,how could he be unconditioned or permanent?

Something unchanging cannot create the impermanent part or parts(that has changing cognitions,feelings,desires)because these go out of existance and come into existance constantly,and a permanent thing cannot change at all.

not only that,as the law of one in peripatetic philosophy states,the permanent can only create one thing timelessly,not multiple things,since it must be one in all real aspects because to be composed of difference and uniqueness means it itself has composed real factors,and is not permanent because it is made up of parts and not self-sufficient(something permanent must be self sufficient and vice versa).

These kinds of problems are what prompted Spinoza to deny that God had a mind or a will at all (he also denies that God has parts). His argument to that effect makes sense, for example:
[If] God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something which he lacks. And though the theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between an end of need and an end of assimilation, they nevertheless confess that God did all things for his own sake, not for the sake of things to be created. For before creation they can assign nothing except God for whose sake God would act. And so they are necessarily compelled to confess that God lacked those things for the sake of which he willed to prepare means, and that he desired them. This is clear through itself.
Ethics, p. 28, Penguin Books 1996

basically,a impermanent thing lacks something,and if a desire arose in him that wasn't there before,he would lack something,no matter if it was eternal either,because his act which acts upon that desire was not eternal,so he was impermanent and lacked his will to act at that particular time.Aswell as his action.A perfect being can lack nothing,neither desires or actions.

[willymonfrete]

basically since impermanent qualities go in and out of existance,they cannot cause themselves nor be caused by a permanent thing which being permanent cannot create variation.So eother God would be a frozen block or the 'God'that changes that abrahamic and Vedic religions speak of cannot exist.

[willymonfrete]

I definately cannot refute burhan e sedeqeen

https://en.wikishia.net/view/Burhan_al-Siddiqin

nor can any atheist/buddhist.

yes,the changing God as portrayed in some texts cannot exist,but there must be a God that is true unchanging reality in itself,unconditioned reality,as the neoplatonists and muslim peripatetics refered to.

[willymonfrete]

it seems to be God can change from absolute goodness to absolute goodness in a different expression,not that he lacked it but is only expressing it .however there cannot be multiple gods because such a God would be composed of a shared quality and a differing quality that is real,and thus would not be self-sufficient,which it must be in order to be eternal.