as karlo broussard writes:
so there must be a unconditioned prime reality that grounds all other realities.this reality cannot be material :We may start by elucidating the whole range of possibilities for all of reality by establishing what philosophers call a complete disjunction. In all of reality there is either at least one unconditioned reality (a reality that does not need any conditions fulfilled in order to exist but exists by its very nature—a reality that exists in and through itself) or no unconditioned reality, in which case all existing things in reality would be conditioned realities (a reality that needs conditions fulfilled in order to exist). For the sake of brevity, we’ll follow the lead of Fr. Spitzer and call the first side of the disjunction Hypothesis UR (at least one unconditioned reality in all of reality) and the other side of the disjunction Hypothesis ~UR (no unconditioned reality in all of reality).
Now, because these hypotheses exhaust the entire range of possibilities in all of reality, one has to be true and the other has to be false. They cannot both be true and they cannot both be false. So, if we can prove that Hypothesis ~UR is false, then we will have simultaneously proven that Hypothesis UR is true. It is my intention to argue as such in this post.
In order to make our navigation through the argument easier, it is necessary that we formulate another complete disjunction for Hypothesis ~UR. If there is no unconditioned reality in all of reality (Hypothesis ~UR), then a conditioned reality (e.g., a cat) is either going to depend upon a finite number of conditions where every condition is a conditioned reality (Hypothesis F) or an infinite number of conditions where every condition is a conditioned reality (Hypothesis ~F).
The thrust of the argument for this part of the demonstration is to show that neither Hypothesis F nor Hypothesis ~F can be true. Since Hypothesis F and Hypothesis ~F elucidate all the possibilities for reality under Hypothesis ~UR, if Hypothesis F and Hypothesis ~F can be proven false, then Hypothesis ~UR must be false as well—which, again, will prove that Hypothesis UR is necessarily true.
Let’s begin by showing the falsity of Hypothesis F, that a conditioned reality (e.g., a cat) is dependent upon a finite number of conditions where every condition is itself a conditioned reality.
First, if the cat is dependent upon a finite number of conditions, then that means there is going to be a most fundamental condition (a last or terminating condition) in the series of conditions that the cat depends upon for its existence right here and right now. For example, the cat is dependent upon the existence of its cells, which in turn are dependent upon amino acids and proteins, the amino acids and proteins depend on the existence of molecules, the molecules depend upon atoms, the atoms depend upon protons, the protons depend upon quarks, and so forth. With such a series, the quark (or something more fundamental) would be the terminating condition that the cat depends upon for its existence right here and right now.
Since Hypothesis ~UR asserts that there are no unconditioned realities in all of reality and only conditioned realities exist, this most fundamental or “last” condition in the series would have to be a conditioned reality, which means it must have its conditions fulfilled in order to exist. But in such a case this conditioned reality could not have its conditions fulfilled since it is the last or most fundamental condition (remember Hypothesis ~UR doesn’t allow for any unconditioned realities).
Now, if this most fundamental condition of the cat is a conditioned reality whose conditions cannot be fulfilled, then it would be non-existent (nothing) and consequently every other conditioned reality dependent on it would be nonexistent as well, including the cat. But the cat does exist. Therefore, the cat cannot be dependent upon a finite number of conditions where every condition is itself a conditioned reality. Hypothesis F is thus false.
What about Hypothesis ~F? Could the cat be dependent upon an infinite number of conditions where every condition is a conditioned reality? There are two lines of reason that lead us to answer this question in the negative.
The first approach takes into consideration the insufficiency of conditioned realities in accounting for the existence of other conditioned realities. Consider for example the cells that the cat is dependent upon for its existence. Upon reflection we notice that the cells have no power in and of themselves to be an existing condition for the cat (i.e., they are not self-sufficient). These cells, in order to exist right here and right now, depend on the existence of amino acids and proteins. In light of this, we may ask, “Are the cells sufficient to account for the cat existing right here and right now?” Obviously the answer is no because we must appeal to the existence of the amino acids and proteins.
The same applies to the amino acids and proteins. They do not have any power in and of themselves to be existing conditions for the cat because they in turn depend, right here and now, on the existence of molecules. As we did for the cells, we may ask, “Are the amino acids and proteins sufficient to account for the cat existing right here and now?” Obviously the answer is no because we must appeal to the existence of molecules.
Now, the molecules have the same existential quality as do the cells and the amino acids and proteins. They are insufficient to account for the existence of the cat because they in turn are conditioned realities depending right here and right now on the existence of atoms. But the atoms in turn are dependent on the existence of protons. This makes the atoms conditioned realties as well and thus insufficient (like the molecules, like the proteins, like the cells) to account for the cat existing right here and right now.
Notice what we have here so far. Any condition of the cat that is in turn a conditioned reality is insufficient to account for the cat existing right here and right now—every one of them “passes the buck” in the search for a sufficient grounding of the cat’s existence.
So, the question now becomes, “Can one arrive at a sufficient explanation for the cat’s existence by postulating an infinite number of insufficient conditions?” (Hypothesis ~F). The answer is no.
The key lies in the fact that the insufficiency of the conditions in the series is not quantitative in nature but qualitative. If the insufficiency was quantitative in nature then the addition of insufficiencies might make a sufficiency (e.g., twenty horses could pull what two could not). But the insufficiency in the series is not quantitative in nature but qualitative. It is more akin to stupidity or blindness. As Bishop Fulton Sheen once wrote, “Ten thousand idiots never make a wise man...one hundred blind men do not make a blind man see.”1 As such, the addition of insufficiencies does not make sufficiency. Therefore, one cannot get a sufficient explanation for the cat’s existence by postulating an infinite number of insufficient conditions.
Now, if one cannot get a sufficient explanation of the cat’s existence by postulating an infinite number of insufficient conditions, then Hypothesis ~F is tantamount to saying that every condition the cat is dependent upon is insufficient to account for the cat existing right here and right now. But if there are no conditions that are sufficient to account for the cat existing right here and right now (no sufficient grounding of the cat’s existence), then the cat would not currently exist. But the cat does currently exist. Therefore, like Hypothesis F, Hypothesis ~F must be false.
The second line of reasoning for disproving Hypothesis ~F shows that if the series of conditioned realities regresses ad infinitum without an unconditioned reality the series itself would be equivalent to nothing. Take for example, as we did before, the cells that the cat is dependent upon. The cells cannot be existing conditions for the cat without the existence of amino acids and proteins. But amino acids and proteins cannot exist as conditions for the cell unless molecules exist. Similarly, molecules cannot be existing conditions for the amino acids and proteins unless atoms exist and the atoms cannot exist as fulfilled conditions for molecules unless protons exist.
Now, if the series regresses infinitely to more and more fundamental conditions that have the same existential status as the aforementioned conditions, then the search for the fulfillment of conditions would go on endlessly. But if the search for the fulfillment of conditions would go on endlessly, then every hypothetical conditioned reality in the series would never have its conditions fulfilled and thus would never come into existence. No matter where we’re at in the series we’ll always come to a conditioned reality that is nonexistent because it is existentially dependent upon other nonexistent conditioned realities. As Fr. Robert Spitzer writes,
"Since every hypothetical conditioned reality is dependent upon other nonexistent conditioned realities for its existence, it will never come into existence. It does not matter whether one posits an infinite number of them; for each one in the series of dependence is still equal to nothing without the reality of the others. But if the “others” are nothing without others, and those “others” are nothing without still others, it does not matter if one postulates an infinite number of others (or arranges the infinite number of others in a circle). They are all still nothing in their dependence upon nonexistent conditions."2
Therefore, an infinite series of conditions where every condition is a conditioned reality is equivalent to a series of nonexistent conditions because no conditioned reality could ever have its conditions fulfilled.
Now we come back to our original question that constitutes Hypothesis ~F: “Could the cat be dependent upon an infinite number of conditions where every condition is a conditioned reality?” In light of the previous reasoning, we have to answer in the negative. If the cat is dependent upon an infinite number of conditions where every condition is a conditioned reality, then the cat would be dependent upon a series of nonexistent conditions. But for the cat to depend upon a series of nonexistent conditions would mean that the cat would not exist. But the cat does exist. Therefore, the cat cannot be dependent upon an infinite number of conditions where each condition is itself a conditioned reality. In other words, Hypothesis ~F is false.
Now, recall that we initially elucidated all the possibilities for Hypothesis ~UR with Hypothesis F and Hypothesis ~F. As such, if Hypothesis F and Hypothesis ~F are false, then Hypothesis ~UR would be false. Hypothesis F and Hypothesis ~F are false (as demonstrated above). Therefore, Hypothesis ~UR must be false.
Furthermore, because we elucidated by way of a complete disjunctive syllogism the whole range of possibilities for all of reality with Hypothesis ~UR and Hypothesis UR, it follows that since Hypothesis ~UR is false, Hypothesis UR must be true—that is to say any conditioned reality (e.g., the cat) must ultimately have its conditions fulfilled by at least one unconditioned reality (a reality that does not depend upon the fulfillment of any conditions for its existence).
there must be a uncreated entity who is absolutely simple,unique and immaterial :First, if the unconditioned reality was restricted in its mode of existence by matter, then it would be restricted by a spatial restriction since all matter has extension in space – it would exist here instead of there. Now, such an intrinsic restriction would allow for a real or really possible incompatible state of being that would be excluded from it. But recall that the unconditioned reality cannot have any real or really possible incompatible states of being on the same level of simplicity that would be excluded from it less we end up with an intrinsic contradiction. Therefore, the unconditioned reality cannot be restricted in its mode of existence by a spatial restriction. And if the unconditioned reality cannot be restricted by a spatial restriction, then it cannot be restricted by matter. In other words, it must be immaterial.
Furthermore, like eternality, the second argument for immateriality comes from the immutability of the unconditioned reality. We know from our experience and from reason that all material things are subject to change. The reason is that all material things have potentiality built into them. The tree has the potential to be cut down; it’s wood to be made into paper. My body has the potential to break down into its component parts and become dust in the grave. The hot tea has the potential to become cool. So, everything that is material is subject to change. But, as proven above, the unconditioned reality is immutable. Therefore, the unconditioned reality must be immaterial.So, along with the key attributes of absolute simplicity and uniqueness (discussed in the previous posts of this series), unconditioned reality is also immutable, eternal, immaterial, and the continuous creator of all else that is. This surely fits the traditional description of “God.”
all religions call this unconditioned uncreated immaterial reality 'God'.whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species–as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man–and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent–as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing’s existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence.